A generating function for the RCK model
Final, final notes on the Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans model
This post re-ups the series on economic geometry; since there is a math student helping me out. Here’s where I left off last time.
The goal of this post is to find a generating function G(k,pₖ=μ,s)1 for the Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans model (Wiki), so that the dynamics given by the generating function2
correspond to the RCK model, and that G=0 implies the Keynes-Ramsey rule (Wiki):
So, let’s get to it!
The first thing to remark is that the RCK model specifies k˙=f(k)-c, the change in capital is the current production minus what is consumed. To describe c in terms of our variables, remember in RCK consumption c provides utility u(c), and our s encodes that utility—so we can impose s=u(c) or equivalently c=u⁻¹(s)3. Then using (*)
in general, where g(k,s) could be any function that does not depend on pₖ.
Now we will consider this in the second dynamic relation in (*), and derive
Ugly. But. We see f’(k) appearing, which is hopefull. We also know ∂u⁻¹/∂s = 1/u’4.
Now let me forego generality and make an ansatz. That is that in the optimal (limit) situation, the last term in brackets is constant. That is
(where I have reintroduced c so you can guess where this is going). Specifying our dynamic relation for pₖ to the optimal path:
so then if we were to choose g such that ∂g/∂k=0 and ∂g/∂s=ρ₂ (constant) and define ρ=ρ₁-ρ₂, we recover the (KR) condition above! Then G=pₖ[f(k)-u⁻¹(s)] + ρ₂(s-s*). and finally,
if we suppose s(0)=0. The system captures “free” utility approaching its limit s* at rate ρ₂. The societal discount rate ρ of (KR) is the time preference ρ₁ corrected for this rate of technology growth ρ₂. G=0 and s=s* imply c*=f(k*), all additional production is consumed.
So, where does this bring us?
Why all this technique to reproduce something we already knew?
Most importantly, we have generalized the model to non-optimality. By considering different functions g(k,s) we can specify how the system approaches its optimal path.
We have—in the illustrated case—distinguished productivity gains ρ₂ from pure time preferences ρ₁, and deduced that the societal discount rate satisfies ρ=ρ₁-ρ₂.5
We have not required (inter-temportal) utility maximization! The dynamics of the generating function then ensure that “free” utility is captured until G=0.
Notation, notation: I will use pₖ for the utility-price of capital k; the economics literature often uses μ and calls it the co-state variable.
Fortunately, a utility function is invertible as it is monotonic (u’>0) and convex (u’’<0).
Differentiating both sides of u(u⁻¹(s))=s with respect to s, we see u’(…)·(u⁻¹)’=1
I am not confident enough in my macroeconomics to write this as r-g.